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TORTS - ACTION IN FRAUD AGAINST PHYSICIAN
,The plaintiff underwent surgery for the removal of diseased
ovaries and fallopian tubes. Two or three days after the operation,
plaintiff complained to the doctor that she was still experiencing the
same pain and swelling in her abdomen that had troubled her before
the operation. The doctor told the woman that he had removed her
uterus, tubes, and ovaries, and that her pain must be coming from'
some other source. The physician continued to treat the patient for
approximately thirteen months, during which time he again assured
her on several occasions that he had removed the organs. Eventually
plaintiff's condition grew critical, whereupon she consulted another
physician, who advised an exploratory abdominal operation. The
operation was performed and a diseased left ovary, which had rup-
tured and formed a cyst "as large as a basketball," was discovered
and removed. Plaintiff brought an action against the doctor for
fraud and deceit, to which defendant demurred on the grounds that
plaintiff had failed to state a cause of action and that the action was
barred by the applicable statute of limitations. The trial court sus-
tained the demurrer but, on appeal, the Oklahoma Supreme Court
overruled the lower court's decision and remanded the case for trial."
In its opinion, the supreme court enumerated the essential ele-
ments of fraud in Oklahoma,2 and concluded that the facts as alleged
in this case would support an action in fraud and deceit. The court
went on to declare that the action was not barred by the applicable
statute of limitations because the suit was commenced within the
statutory period of two years after the fraud was discovered, al-
though more than two years after the operation had been performed.
The application of the theory of deceit in this case represents a
comparatively recent development in the evolution of this doctrine.
Traditionally, the action of deceit was confined to a great extent to
the invasion of interests of a financial or commercial character.3
However, this can be attributed to the historical development of the
action,4 rather than to any inherent limitation in its nature. That
this is true can be discerned from the recognition long given in two
1. Nutt v. Carson, 340 P. 2d 260 (Okla. 1959).
2. Id. at 263. The essentials of fraud as stated by the court are: (a) a material representation
by defendant, (b) which is false, (c) and which defendant knew was false when he made it,
or which was made recklessly without knowledge of the truth, (d) that defendant intended
that plaintiff rely on it, (e) that plaintiff did rely on it, (f) that he thereby suffered injury.
3. See PROSSER, TORTS 521 (2d ed. 1955). See also RESTATEmENT, TORTS, Scope Note to
Chapter 22, preceding § 525.
4. SREET, FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL LIABILITY, 375-76 (1906).
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jurisdictions to actions for deceit based solely on personal injuries,5
and from the extension of deceit in still a third state to what was es-
sentially a malpractice action.6
The application of the deceit theory to a suit against a doctor
presents a problem which the court in Nutt v. Carson did not men-
tion. Since the statutes of limitation for fraud and for malpractice
are, for all practical purposes, the same in Oklahoma,7 the court was
not compelled to consider this question which has often been raised
in other jurisdictions: viz., does the form of the action determine
which statute of limitations is to be applied? Most malpractice ac-
tions contain elements of negligence as well as a breach of contract
between the physician and patient; consequently, actions have been
brought under both theories. The majority of courts have reasoned
that the plaintiff's injury in malpractice cases is caused principally by
the physician's negligence, and that, therefore, the statute of limita-
tions for negligence is appropriate, even when the injured party sues
on the contract.8  However, a significant minority of jurisdictions
have held that, if the action is brought on the contract, the statutory
limitation for that action applies.9
"MALPRACTICE" IN OHIO
In Ohio, the problem has been resolved by the enactment of a
special statute of limitations for malpractice, which the Ohio courts
have determined applies regardless of the form of the action.10 Un-
fortunately, as a result of this strict application of the statute, the
malpractice victim in Ohio sometimes finds that the scales of justice
appear to be weighted in favor of the negligent physician. The Ohio
Supreme Court has ruled that fraudulent concealment of malpractice
by a physician will not toll the running of the one year statute of
limitations, since this is not expressly provided for in the statute."
As a result, there have been several cases in Ohio in which the plain-
tiff has been denied relief because he did not become aware of the
5. Flaherty v. Till, 119 Minn. 191, 137 N.W. 815 (1912); Benoit v. Perkins, 79 N.H. 11,
104 At. 254 (1918).
6. Krestich v. Stefanez, 243 Wisc. 1, 9 N.W.2d 139 (1943).
7. The statutory limit is two years for both fraud and malpractice in Oklahoma. Also, the
statutory periods both begin to run against the action when the fraud is discovered, as deter-
mined by the words of the statute for fraud (12 OKLA. STAT. § 95 subd. 3), and by decision
for malpractice (Seanor v. Browne, 15 Okla. 222, 7 P.2d 627 (1932)).
8. Harding v. Liberty Hospital Corp., 177 Cal. 520, 171 Pac. 98 (1918); Hurlburt v. Gillett,
96 Misc. 585, 161 N.Y. Supp. 994 (1916). See Annot., 74 A.L.R. 1256.
9. Staley v. Jameson, 46 Ind. 159, 15 Am. Rep. 285 (1874). See Annor., 74 A.L.R. 1256,
1260.
10. Bowers v. Santee, 99 Ohio St. 361, 124 N.E. 238 (1919), overruling McArthur v. Bow-
ers, 72 Ohio St. 656, 76 N.E. 1128 (1905), overruling Gillette v. Tucker, 67 Ohio St. 106,
65 N.E. 865 (1902).
11. Delany v. Campbell, 157 Ohio St. 22, 104 N.E.2d 177 (1952).
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tort until more than one year after the physician had stopped treating
him.'2
It would seem that the answer to this problem would be a suit in
fraud. The period of limitation for fraud in Ohio is four years.18
Moreover, the statute expressly provides that the period does not
commence running until the fraud is discovered. This remedy, how-
ever, is also foreclosed to the plaintiff in Ohio. In Swankowski v.
Diethelm,14 the appellate court ruled that an action in fraud, where
the cause of action is fundamentally one of malpractice, is governed
by the statute of limitations for malpractice. The court in this case
supported its decision by reference to the well-established rule in
Ohio that the form of the action must be distinguished from the
cause of the action, and that where the cause of the action is malprac-
tice, that statutory limit must be applied.' 5
As the situation now exists in Ohio, the deceived malpractice vic-
tim has no remedy after the one year statute of limitations has run.
But it is conceivable that the suit in fraud offers another solution to
the problem. The doctrine of equitable estoppel has often been used
by the courts to bar a defense based upon the statute of limitations,
where the elements of estoppel have otherwise been present,' 6 and
one area in which estoppel is most readily applied is fraud. In Mc-
Campbell v. Southard, the Ohio Supreme Court stated:
It is generally held that if the defendant has been guilty of fraud by
knowingly making false representations to the plaintiff and thereby
causing him to allow the statutory period to run, he may be estopped
from asserting the statute of limitations as a bar.17
CONCLUSION
It is palpably inequitable that a physician, by his own artifice,
should be allowed to prevent his victim from invoking his legal reme-
dies. As the Ohio Supreme Court stated in Bowers v. Santee:
The law should not require impossible or unreasonable things. It
should not impose upon the patient a duty that he can only know
through expert knowledge which he does not possess, but as to which
he is compelled to accept the judgment of his physician or surgeon.'8
As a possible solution to this problem, it is suggested that the
Ohio courts take cognizance of the fact that other jurisdictions are
beginning to recognize an action resting in fraud against physicians,
12. Ibid.; Amstutz v. King, 103 Ohio St. 674, 135 N.E. 973 (1921).
13. OMo Rnv. CODE § 2305.09.
14. 98 Ohio App. 271, 129 N.E.2d 182 (1953).
15. See note 10 supra.
16. McI.earn v. Hill, 276 Mass. 519, 177 N.E. 617 (1931); Brookman v. Metcalf, 4 Robt.
568 (N.Y. 1867). See Annor., 130 A.L.R. 8, 64.
17. 62 Ohio App. 341, 23 N.E.2d 955 (1937).
18. 99 Ohio St. 361, 367, 134 N.E. 238, 240 (1919).
1960]
